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Abstract : Does public policy in the United Kingdom respond to changes in public
preferences? If so, is this the result of the government changing its policy to reﬂect
preferences (“policy accommodation”) or the result of governments that pursue
unpopular policies being replaced at elections by governments more in line with the
public (“electoral turnover”)? We explore these questions by estimating annual
aggregate public preferences (“the policy mood”) using responses to 287 questions
administered 2,087 times and annual policy using budgetary data (“nonmilitary
government expenditure”) for the whole of the postwar period. We ﬁnd that mood
moves in the opposite direction to policy and variations in mood are associated
with variations in annual vote intentions. Policy is responsive to party control but
not directly responsive to mood. Shifts in mood eventually lead to a change in
government and thus policy, but this process may be very slow if the public has
doubts about the competence of the opposition.
Keywords: accommodation, electoral turnover, policymood, representation,
responsiveness
In this article, we examine whether the policy in Britain is shaped by public
preferences. We examine two accounts by which policy responsiveness
could be achieved. “Policy accommodation” suggests that ofﬁce-seeking
governments respond directly to changes in preferences by changing policy.
“Electoral turnover”, on the other hand, suggests that policy responds
indirectly. Parties pursue policies consistent with their ideology. The
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public’s preferences respond to policy “thermostatically”, moving right
as policy moves left and left as it moves right (Wlezien 1995).
These movements produce changes in vote intentions and, ultimately,
a turnover of power from one “side” to the other. This process, however,
may only operate after a considerable time lag if the public initially lacks
faith in the competence of the opposition.
There are two sets of reasons why we should be concerned with whether
the policy is responsive to public opinion. First, from a strictly positive point
of view, we want to know to what degree government policy is constrained
by public opinion. To what degree are policymakers forced to react
to changes in public opinion and to what degree are they able to act
independently of it? Second, from a normative point of view, we are
interested in how “well” democracy is functioning – do governments act
in a way that is representative of the public? Of course, there are many
different conceptions of democracy, some of which do not require
the congruence of public opinion and policy in a substantive sense.1
Nevertheless, the basic meaning of democracy is that the “people rule”, and
this is often interpreted to mean that the people should have control of the
broad direction of policy (May 1978; Rehfeld 2009; Petitt 2010). As
Andrew Rehfeld puts it, “… the presumption of democracy is that there
be a close correspondence between the laws of a nation and the preferences
of citizens who are ruled by them” (2009, 214).
However, when we consider representative democracy, it is not
immediately obvious how responsive policy should be to public opinion,
especially if we embrace a trustee conception of representation. If we think
that the appropriate form of representation is a delegate model – the
government ought to follow the instructions of the people – and we apply
this to the government as a whole as opposed to individual representatives,
then we should expect government policy to follow public opinion.2 Of
course, it is still necessary to interpret what the people’s “instructions” are.3
1 For example, there are “minimalist” theories of democracy, which argue that the value of
democracy is simply the discipline imposed on governments by the fact they can be replaced
(Schumpeter 1942;Weber 1978; Riker 1982). Przeworski (1999) goes as far as to argue that even
the random replacement of governments could bring many of the beneﬁts of democracy. Other
theories of democracy are strictly procedural, arguing that democracy should be deﬁned in terms
of the fairness of the institutions, rather than its policy outcomes. The “populist theory of
democracy” in Dahl’s (1956, Chapter 2) Preface to Democratic Theory is of this kind.
2 If representatives act as delegates for separate constituencies, we may not observe respon-
siveness to public opinion as a whole. For example, delegates who are strictly bound by the
instructions of their constituents may lack the discretion necessary to reach the compromises
needed to pass any legislation at all.
3 Of course, the public does not in general issue explicit instructions. Rather, we need to infer
the intentions of the public from election results. For example, parties may offer electoral
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Even in this case, we might expect the government to follow the will of the
people in broad terms rather than in terms of speciﬁc policies. Following
Christiano (1996, 215–217), we might expect the government to be a
delegate in terms of ends, while being a trustee in terms of means.
However, if we endorse a trustee model of representation – representa-
tives are expected to use their judgement to advance the interests of the
people to the best of their ability – then a considerable amount of slippage
between public opinion and policy may be completely acceptable in a
democracy. It is still possible that trusteeship will produce a high degree of
responsiveness. If the people choose trustees whose values and interests
align closely with their own, they may choose policies that naturally track
the preferences of the public (what Mansbridge 2003 terms “gyroscopic
representation”). Similarly, trustee representation and popular control
could be reconciled through deliberation and public reason, in what Pettit
calls “interpretive representation”.4 On the other hand, while trustees are
expected to act in the interest of the public, they also may choose policies
that differ from what the public wants. If the policies demanded by the
public want are impossible or ill-advised (they do not achieve the ends the
public wishes to achieve), then trustee representation will result in policies
that diverge from what the public wants.5
However, it is important not to take this argument too far. While trustee
representation allows for some slippage between public opinion and policy,
we should still be concerned if there is a complete disconnect. If democratic
trusteeship allows the public to be completely disregarded, then there is
a danger that it simply becomes a euphemism for benign despotism or
paternalism. A trustee, according to Burke (2009), must make decisions in
the interests of the people, and may not substitute their own interests in
place of those of the people. When we observe government policy diverging
from public opinion, we are faced with the question as to whether this is the
legitimate use of trusteeship in the interests of the people, or whether the
government is substituting its own interests for those of the people. Lack of
programmes and pledges, and the public may endorse them by electing the party (what Mans-
bridge 2003 refers to as “promissory representation”). Alternatively, governments could observe
public opinion and react to what the public wants, anticipating that the electorate will punish it at
the next election if it does not (“anticipatory representation” in Mansbridge’s terminology).
4 Petitt (2010) rejects the idea that public opinion exists exogenously and controls policy, and
argues that a trustee conception of representation is inevitable. However, he argues that public
opinion and policy correspond to one another in a democracy because both are determined by the
same process of deliberation and public reason. Indeed Petitt (2010, 82) argues that the West-
minster system is responsive to public opinion precisely because the representatives behave as
trustees.
5 We might also consider the standard proposed by Fishkin (1995), who argued that repre-
sentatives should adopt the policies the public would choose if they were properly informed.
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policy responsiveness certainly does not prove that there has been a failure
of democratic representation, but it does call for explanation and
justiﬁcation. As Rehfeld argues, “we must always justify and explain cases
in which law deviates from citizen preferences, whereas no such prima facie
justiﬁcation is required in cases when law conforms to the preferences and
wills of those it governs” (2009, 214).
Thus, while responsiveness does not give us a simple measure of demo-
cratic representation, it can still provide a valuable test of it. We would
argue that the responsiveness of aggregate public spending to public
opinion is actually a more appropriate test than the responsiveness of
particular policies or the budget allocations to particular departments.
This is because it is a very general measure of policy that reﬂects broad
visions of society, rather than speciﬁc policy expertise. If detailed public
policies do not reﬂect public opinion, a government can always claim that it
is acting as a trustee, using its superior technical knowledge to make
informed decisions. It may even claim that what the public wants is
impossible. However, it is clearly possible to have different levels of
aggregate spending and taxes, as this varies greatly amongst countries.6
Furthermore, there does not exist a technocratic consensus about what the
appropriate size of government is; rather this appears to be a matter of
values, and the type of society people prefer. If the government persistently
ignores public opinion in such a general sense, wemaywell worry that it has
exceeded its role as trustee and substituted its own values for those of the
people.
In addition to the policy responsiveness we study, other forms
of responsiveness may also be valuable in testing how representative
government is. One example is attention responsiveness (Jennings and John
2009; Bertelli and John 2013; John et al. 2013; Bevan and Jennings 2014).
This considers the degree to which the policy priorities of governments
(typically measured by the weight given to various policy areas in theQueen’s
speech) corresponds to the policy priorities of the public (usually measured
by the answer to the question of what is the most important problem facing
the country). While policy responsiveness and attention responsiveness both
deal with the allocation of a scare resource (money or time), they seem to
behave quite differently (see Bevan and Jennings 2014; Jennings andWlezien
2015).7 Nevertheless, if a government is representative of the people, we
6 In 2015 government spending as percentage of GDP in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2017) countries varied from 29% in Ireland to 57% in Finland.
7 Bevan and Jennings (2014) ﬁnd that while government attention (measured by either
mentions in the Queens speech or legislation) does respond to the public’s assessment of pro-
blems, government spending does not in a statistically signiﬁcant way. Jennings and Wlezien
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would expect it to pay attention to the issues that the people think are
important, even if it does not necessarily allocate more money to these areas.
If a government consistently ignores the issues the people think are impor-
tant, we are surely entitled to ask whether the government is really repre-
senting the interests of the people.
While responsiveness may not provide us with a direct measure of
democratic representation, it does provide a valuable of a test of it. If we do
not observe responsiveness (whether in policy or attention), this may serve
as a warning ﬂag that demands explanation. This caveat aide, we examine
the relationship between preferences and policy in Britain from 1945 to
2015 using macrolevel indicators and appropriate time series methods.
In the next section, we introduce the left-right framework to summarise
preferences and policy. In the next two sections, we conceptualise both
these as time series (“the policy mood” and “nonmilitary government
spending”) that respond to each other. We describe the time series models
in some detail before examining the two steps in the “electoral turnover”
mechanism (whether mood responds to policy and vote to mood). We then
examine both the ﬁnal stage in the electoral turnover mechanism (whether
policy responds to the party) and the policy accommodation mechanism
(whether policy responds to mood). We ﬁnally compare our ﬁndings
with previous studies and then we draw conclusions about the impact of
party ideology.
The left-right framework
Disagreements about goals are central to most accounts of representative
democracy because they motivate parties and electorate alike (Downs 1957).
Parties pursue ideological goals subject to electoral considerations
(Strøm 1990). The electorate wants governments both to produce policy that
honours their values and govern with competence (Stimson et al. 1995;
Erikson et al. 2002). Preferences and positions link parties with the electorate
and provide the basis for effective communication (Scarbrough 1984).
There are a very large number of issues that people disagree about. If we
are to understand the interaction between parties and the electorate we need
to cut away inessential detail (Budge 2006). Accordingly, we assume that
the interaction between parties and the electorate takes place along a single
left-right dimension (Downs 1957). The preferences that are of interest to us
are those on which the parties have taken positions. “Left” means those
(2015) show that the public perception of a problem being important does not in general correlate
with a public demand for more money to be spent on the issue.
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preferences expressed or positions adopted by Labour. “Right” means
those adopted by the Conservatives (Budge and Farlie 1977).
Parties aim to attract voters. They take positions on a wide range of
issues. Some are enduring. Some are transient. The “core” issues that divide
the major parties relate to economics. Labour has generally supported
“more” government activity, “more” collective action and “more”
equality. The Conservatives have generally supported “less” (Blais et al.
1993). Nevertheless, Labour and the Conservatives disagree on other
issues relating to law and order, individual freedom, the environment and
international affairs. As new issues emerged, the parties have adopted
opposing positions, and these have acquired “left” or “right” polarities
(Carmines and Stimson 1989). It is usual, for example, to label support
for shorter sentences, equal rights for gays, environment protection and
international cooperation as “left-wing”. This enables analysts to use texts
to summarise party positions using both economic and noneconomic
positions. The MARPOR “RILE” scores, for example, provide evidence
about how parties compete for ofﬁce (Budge et al. 2001; McDonald
and Budge 2005).
There are doubts whether public preferences can be so simpliﬁed (Budge
2006). Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve the vexing issue of the
“real” structure of public preferences here (Stimson 2004). Our purpose
is simply to summarise preferences in such a way as to understand the
interaction between parties and the electorate. Accordingly, we focus on
the core economic issues that represent the enduring differences between the
parties relating to government intervention, collective action and economic
equality (Heath et al. 1994). This decision also simpliﬁes the measurement
of policy since it is difﬁcult – if not impossible – to produce annualmeasures
of policy that incorporate both economic and noneconomic issues using
textual data.8
Measuring macrolevel preferences: annual policy mood
If we are to analyse responsiveness we need a public preference time series
(Erikson et al. 2002). Microlevel theories provide us with good reasons
for believing that we can use preferences across a wide range of issues to
produce an annual indicator of public preferences. Many issues become
“seemingly relate”’ and acquire “left-right” polarities (Carmines and
Stimson 1989). Since most people have low levels of political awareness,
they absorb both “left” and “right” considerations (Zaller and Feldman
8 See Hakhverdian (2010) for such an attempt.
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1992). The typical individual is “ambivalent” about issues. Their responses
to questions depend on their predispositions, the issues raised, precise
wording and response options offered. Individual predispositions can be
viewed as a running tally of “left” and “right” considerations across all
issues. If we could aggregate preferences across both individuals and issues,
this “double summation” would provide an indicator of the electorate’s
aggregate (varying) left-right preferences or “policy mood” (Stimson 1999).
We cannot directly average aggregate responses across survey items.
Each survey question has its own biases as a result of the issues that
it engages, precise wording and response options provided (Zaller and
Feldman 1992). Each question has its own metric. Nevertheless, we can use
a method – the dyads ratio algorithm – to ﬁnd a common metric and then
aggregate across issues (Stimson 1999). Before we outline this method,
however, we describe the data at our disposal.
Data: the preferences database
Responses to a wide range of survey probes reﬂect left-right preferences.
Variations in responses over time should, therefore, reﬂect the changing
“policy mood” (Stimson 1999). The raw data to estimate mood are
aggregate responses to controversial questions. They require people to
choose between options, express “preferences”, adopt “positions” or take
“sides” (Stokes 1963; Ellis and Stimson 2012).
Since mood is inferred by observing changes between two time points,
identical questions must be asked in at least two separate years to form
“dyads” (Stimson 1999). Items that refer to particular parties or politicians
are excluded from the database, since it is difﬁcult to disentangle attitudes
to these objects from preferences.9 All the data are taken from nationally
representative surveys. In total, the database contains 791 items and 5,363
separate readings of preferences.10
Content
Our database consists of responses to many controversial issues on
which the parties can be expected to take contrasting positions. Some 287
questions in 2,087 separate readings of preferences (39.7% of the total)
9 Questions that refer to “the government” are a special case. Where the question refers to
government in the abstract it is retained. Where it refers to the incumbents, it is not included.
10 We cannot be claim that we found all the data. We can claim that we used all the data that
we could ﬁnd. The series vary greatly in length. The longest Gallup series on whether “trades
unions are a good thing” spans some 45 years and is entered in the database some 58 times.Many
others span just two years. The longest series relate to the core issues.
Policy accommodation versus electoral turnover 7
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relate to “core economic” domain, including government intervention,
trade unions, public ownership, public spending, taxation, inequality and
the trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment (see Table 1). Another
1,102 readings (21% of the total readings) relate to “social” issues. This
domain includes crime and law and order, moral and social attitudes,
individual rights, the family and abortion. The “other” category (around
Table 1. Items topics for policy mood, 1945–2015
Topic or Domain Number %
Economics
Government intervention versus free-market* 246 4.6
Trade unions and industrial relations* 507 9.5
Welfare state and social beneﬁts* 282 5.3
Public versus private ownership* 215 4.0
Public services spending* 231 4.3
Tax and spending* 159 3.0
Poverty, inequality and redistribution* 314 5.9
Inﬂation and unemployment* 133 2.5
Total economics 2,087 39.3
Social
Crime and law and order 317 6.0
Moral and social attitudes 469 8.8
Individual rights 21 0.4
Family 122 2.3
Postmaterialist values 39 0.7
Abortion 134 2.5
Total social 1,102 20.7
Other
Race relations and immigration 213 4.0
Environment 305 5.7
International affairs 178 3.3
Defence spending 51 1.0
Nuclear weapons 81 1.5
Northern Ireland 53 1.0
Europe 878 16.5
British nationalism 53 1.0
Government 13 0.2
Monarchy 107 2.0
Constitutional reform 78 1.5
Religion 17 0.3
Left-right self-placement 101 1.9
Total other 2,128 40.0
Total 5,317 100
Note: *Indicates used to estimate the policy mood.
8 BARTLE , AVELLANEDA AND MCGANN
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40% of all readings) relate to diverse issues including immigration, inter-
national affairs, defence spending, nuclear weapons, Northern Ireland,
Europe, national sentiment, the monarchy and left-right self-placement.
If we were conﬁdent that public preferences – like party positions – were
undimensional, we could estimate mood using all the available data.
Since we are ignorant of the real structure, we estimate mood using only
items relating to the “core economic” issues. Even after this self-imposed
restriction, however, there here is more than sufﬁcient data to reliably
estimate annual mood.
Coding responses
Our focus here is on the “core” left-right issues. Responses are scored
from high (most left or Labour) and to low (most right or Conservative)
responses. It is straightforward to code these items since the parties
have taken consistent (opposing) positions.11 Assigning the “wrong”
polarities to responses makes no difference to the estimates of mood – it
simply results in negative factor loadings that alert us to a coding error
(Stimson 1999).
All preferences are expressed as an index of preferences:
Index of preferences=
PN
i= 1 Left preferences
PN
i= 1 Left +Right preferences
´ 100
These indexes reﬂect then the balance of left-right preferences on con-
troversial issues. They are fed into the dyads ratio algorithm in order to
estimate mood.
Method: the dyads ratio algorithm
The raw index of preferences represents the percentage of all substantive
responses that are “left”.12 Each index is then expressed as a ratio at two
time points (years).
Rij =
xt + i
xt + j
These dyads have an expected value of 1.0 and can be averaged to
produce a rough estimate of underlying preferences (Pt). The algorithm
11 It is not difﬁcult to code responses items as left and right. The exceptions relate to techno-
logical issues such as those relating to genetics on which the parties have not taken positions.
12 The mood can also be estimated by McGann’s (2014) estimated based on item-response
theory. The two methods produce very similar results.
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calculates all the possible dyads for each series xtk iteratively and
averages them:13
Pt =
PN
k=1 xtk
N
Since not all items are equally valid indicators of underlying preferences,
each series is weighted by their estimated validity hi2.
Pt =
PN
k= 1 h
2
i xtk
h2N
Using ratios causes the original metric to be lost. This is reintroduced by a
standardisation of the latent scale in terms of the validity-weighted means
and standard deviations of the input items (Stimson 1999). The individual
items are scored as per cent left over per cent left plus per cent right. The
estimated mood, therefore, has the same interpretation; 50 is the neutral
point. Values above 50 indicate net left preferences and those below
50 indicate net right preferences.
Estimates of the policy mood
Figure 1 displays the estimated mood from 1945 to 2015. About 46% of all
variance in observed preferences is common to this mood. The remaining
variance – some 54% – is either speciﬁc to the particular issue domain or is
item-speciﬁc; that is, a function of the speciﬁc wording and measurement
error for each question (Erikson et al. 2002, 203).
Averaging over many items reduces the noise induced by sampling errors
(Stimson 1999).14 In the early period from 1945 to 1964, when data are in
shorter supply, the series zig-zags (shown by the broken line in Figure 1). In
the later period, after 1964, the series is smoother (shown by the unbroken
line). Nevertheless, the overall pattern is clear. The series starts off high
(left) in the 1950s and then generally drifts down (right) until 1979.15 From
1979 onwards the series tracks back up and to the left, peaking in the
early 1990s. This pattern matches standard accounts of public opinion
(Kavanagh 1988). From 1997 the series drifts down (right) under New
Labour. It reaches its lowest point in 2010 when the Conservatives return to
power in a coalition government. It then reverses itself under the coalition
13 The algorithm estimates dyads both forwards and backwards and averages the two.
14 The policy mood series can be smoothed using an exponential operator. All the models here
use unsmoothed mood.
15 The series bounces up in the late 1940s – probably a result of the thinness of the data. This
has no consequences for our analyses. The mood models are estimated from 1948; the vote
intentions models from 1951. Bi-annual estimates of the mood produce essentially identical
results.
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government between 2010 and 2015. Indeed, by 2015, the mood was as far
left as it had been in 2004, the year before Labour won a third election victory.
Broadly speaking, these movements seem to be related to the electoral
performance of the parties. This suggests that the mood series has a degree
of face validity. In particular, three “turning point” elections were presaged
bymovements in themood. The Conservative victory in 1979, NewLabour’s
landslide in 1997 and the Tories return to power – as the dominant party in
the coalition in 2010 – all appear to reﬂect prior movements. Yet some
election outcomes do not seem to be explicable given movements in the
mood. The October 1974 and 1979 general elections, for example, produced
a Labour victory on the one hand and a Conservative victory on the other,
despite the similar levels of mood. Similarly, the 1992 and 1997 elections
produced a Conservative victory and a Labour landslide, though the mood
was at much the same level. Other factors – social change, party positions
and assessments of party competence – must be taken into account.
In order to illustrate the content of mood, we brieﬂy examine the factor
loadings for individual items on the estimated mood series. Since there are
287 series, it is not possible to examine all the loadings. And, since the series
vary in length, it would be misleading examine the loadings for all the
individual series. Table 2 displays the loadings for the items that are entered
into the database in at least 10 years and load at 0.5 or above.
The items that load on mood relate to trade unions, welfare, tax and
spending, and inequality. This is a consequence of our decision to include only
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Figure 1 The policy mood, 1945–2015.
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the “core” issues. The same itemswould feature prominently in the equivalent
table if we had estimated the mood using all the preferences data.16 Themood
estimated from this larger database, moreover, correlates highly with our
mood measure (Pearson’s R=0.90). These observations do not resolve the
issue of the dimensionality of preferences. They do reassure us that our
decision to use only “core” items is not consequential. Averaging a large
number of items produces a robust estimator of preferences.
Measuring annual macrolevel policy
In order to assess the interaction between governments and the electorate, it
is necessary to develop a measure of government policy analogous to our
measure of mood. “Policy” is a course of action or the principles adopted
Table 2. Item loadings of policy mood, 1945–2015
Abbreviated question House N Loading
Trade unions are a good thing Gallup 40 0.96
Welfare makes people less able to stand on feet BSA 25 0.94
Increase taxes and spending Gallup 19 0.92
Trade unions too powerful Gallup 24 0.91
People on beneﬁts do not deserve them BSA 25 0.90
Spend more on welfare BSA 25 0.88
Class struggle BSA 14 0.87
Trade unions too powerful Mori 18 0.83
Beneﬁts are too high or low BSA 30 0.83
Increase tax and spending BSA 31 0.82
Unemployed could ﬁnd a job if wanted BSA 25 0.81
Cutting beneﬁts damages lives BSA 15 0.81
Gap between incomes too large BSA 26 0.74
Government should redistribute income BSA 29 0.73
Government spend more on pensions Gallup 20 0.72
Trade unions extreme Mori 15 0.71
People ﬁddle on dole BSA 25 0.68
Trade unions are essential Mori 18 0.68
Welfare state proud achievement BSA 16 0.67
Compulsory trade union membership Gallup 11 0.66
Social class affects opportunities BSA 10 0.65
One law for the rich and one law for poor BSA 28 0.65
Business too powerful BSA 11 0.57
Welfare state stops self-help BSA 14 0.55
16 The additional items that would meet joint requirements would include items relating to
the European Union, left-right self-placement, environmentalism and postmaterialism.
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by the government. It is difﬁcult to summarise because governments take
lots of action make many statements of principle. They legislate, enter into
treaties, make administrative decisions, tax and spend, and issue statements
of intent. It is also difﬁcult to summarise because it can be indicated by both
words (intentions) and deeds (actions and policy delivery).
Nonmilitary government spending
Spending is a particularly appropriate indicator of delivered policy. It
provides a numeraire that gets to the heart of the choice between “more” or
“less” (Blais et al. 1996, 43; Soroka et al. 2006). The key indicator of total
managed expenditure (TME), for example, summarises government
activity in an annual time series. This includes Departmental Expenditure
Limits that have been allocated to Departments and Annually Managed
Expenditure that is not controlled by government departments.17
The parties’ preferences about spending reﬂect their ideologies. Labour
governments prefer “more” spending on welfare, health and transport.
Conservative governments prefer “less”. In some domains, however, these
preferences are reversed. The most signiﬁcant case is defence spending. This
ﬂuctuated between a high of 9.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) in
1953 to a low of 2% in 2015.18 In general, Conservatives prefer more and
Labour prefers less spending on defence. Military spending, moreover, is
inﬂuenced by perceptions of threat and is less responsive to domestic
politics. In order to provide a more accurate indicator of domestic policy,
we subtract defence as a percentage of GDP spending from TME to produce
nonmilitary government expenditure (NMGE).
Figure 2 displays the NMGE series from 1950 through to 2015.19 This
provides evidence of year on year variation but says little about the impact
of party control of government over policy. Figure 3 displays changes in
NMGE under governments from 1951 to 2015. Dark blocs indicate Con-
servative governments; lighter blocs indicate Labour. This tells a fascinating
story. All Conservative governments, with the single exception of Heath
(1970–1974), have reduced NMGE.20 All Labour governments have
17 See the Glossary in the Public Finances Data Bank: http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/docs/
dlm_uploads/PSF_aggregates_databank_September_2016.xls
18 Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): https://www.sipri.
org/databases/milex
19 The NMGE series starts in 1951 because the SIPRI database starts then. This is also
convenient since it misses out the major period of demilitarisation 1945–1950.
20 TheHeath government started off by cutting spending but was forced to increase as a result
of domestic opposition and the oil-price shocks. Since there was a change of government
following the February 1974 election, the end point for the Heath government and the start date
for the Wilson government is 1973.
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Figure 2 Nonmilitary government spending, 1948–2013.
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Figure 3 Changes in nonmilitary government expenditure by government,
1951–2015.
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increased it. Our characterisation of elections as a choice between “more”
with Labour and “less”with the Conservatives has a degree of face validity.
Average direct taxation
The electorate is collectively ambivalent about the government policy activity.
They prefer “more” public services. They also prefer “less” bureaucracy and
taxation. They also worry about the impact of welfare on individual incen-
tives (Zaller and Feldman 1992). Since it is difﬁcult to produce time series
indicators of bureaucracy and incentives, we focus on taxation.21 Speciﬁcally,
we incorporate a measure of the average direct tax (income tax plus national
insurance) paid by male workers on median incomes (see Figure 4).22 This
measure does not, of course, cover all taxes but reﬂects public debates in
Britain, which have centred on direct taxation.23
Methodology
When we inspect the graphs for mood, vote intentions and domestic spend-
ing, it is clear that these variables are not stationary. That is to say, they do
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Figure 4 Average direct tax levels (1949–2012).
21 In principle, we could incorporate Ofﬁce for National Statistics indicator of public sector
current receipts. This indicator is highly correlated, however, with TME.
22 Direct taxes include income tax and national insurance. Estimates to 2005 were produced
by Frances Lynch at the University of Westminster (Johnson et al. 2005). This has been updated
to 2013 by the authors.
23 This is despite the fact that income tax generates only £182 billion of the £721 billion
(25%) of total revenue in 2016/2017. See H. M. Treasury, Budget 2016 (https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/508193/HMT_Budget_2016_Web_
Accessible.pdf).
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not oscillate around a single mean, but instead the mean moves over time.
Formal stationarity tests conﬁrm this.24 Nonstationarity creates problems
when analysing time series, in particular the problem of spurious regression
(Enders 2004). It is quite likely that two nonstationary variables will correlate
signiﬁcantly, even if they are completely unrelated. We need to ensure that our
results are not simply the result of such spurious correlation.
One approach to the problem of nonstationarity is to take the ﬁrst
difference of the data (or further differences if necessary), so we have
a stationary time series. This deals with nonstationarity but only allows us
to draw inferences about the short-term dynamics of the relationship
between the variables. An alternative approach is to use the error correction
model approach of the type:
ΔYt = b0 + b1ΔXt + a Yt1  g0  g1 Xt1ð Þ
This also allows us to model the long-term relationships between the
variables. It assumes that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between
the variables, and that the further out of equilibrium we are the larger the
adjustment (the parameter a represents the speed of this adjustment). However,
error correction models are only appropriate with nonstationary data if the
variables are cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987). Roughly speaking, this
means that the variables move up and down in parallel, and the relationship
remains approximately the same over the whole time period.25 If the variables
are not cointegrated, we again face the problem of spurious regression.
We use the error correction model whenever there is a suitable coin-
tegrating relationship. We test for cointegration in two ways. First, we run
an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals of the regression of the
variables in levels. Second, the error correction parameter is itself a test of
cointegration. However, when using this as a test for cointegration, it is
necessary to use the distribution derived by MacKinnon (1994) and
Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002), instead of the normal t-distribution
reported by most software packages (see Grant and Lebo 2016). We
ﬁnd strong evidence of cointegration in our models with mood and vote
intentions as the dependent variable, and use error correction models in
these cases. However, we do not ﬁnd sufﬁcient evidence of cointegration for
our model explaining NMGE. In this case, we take the ﬁrst difference of
government spending, modelling the change in government spending as a
24 The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics (lag order 3) for the three dependent variables were
as follows: Policy mood −2.02 (p=0.57); Vote intentions −2.43 (p=0.40); Domestic spending
−1.93 (p= 0.60). In all cases the null hypothesis of a nonstationary unit root process cannot be
rejected.
25 Formally this requires that when the variables are regressed, the error term is stationary.
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function of mood and economic conditions. This is similar to the approach
in Soroka and Wlezien (2009).
There has recently been a debate about the appropriateness of error
correction models in political science. In a special edition of Political
Analysis, Grant and Lebo (2016) argue that many applications of error
correction models are inappropriate because they are applied to data where
cointegration is not present. They suggest that the conditions required to
use error correction models rarely apply in political science. Others have
argued that error correction models are more widely applicable (Enns et al.
2016; Esarey 2016; Keele et al. 2016).26 However, there is agreement that if
the data are nonstationary, error correction models are only appropriate
where cointegration is present. We only use error correction models where
there is clear evidence of cointegration, using the tests recommended by
Grant and Lebo (2016).27
Does mood respond to policy?
We now examine the electoral turnover mechanism in two stages. In this
section, we examine whether public preferences (as measured by the policy
mood) respond to policy. In the next section, we examine whether vote
intentions respond to the policy mood.
Previous research has established that preferences for policy (Rij)
reﬂect the difference between ideal points (Pi) and actual policy (Pj)
(Wlezien 1995).
Rij = Pi Pj
When actual policy exceeds the ideal (Pi>Pj) then Rij> 0 and the electorate
signal their preference for less. When a policy is less than ideal (Pi<Pj) then
Rij< 0 and the electorate signal their preferences for “more” activity.
Preferences act like a “thermostat” (Wlezien 1995). The same logic applies
to mood. As spending increases the public want less. Accordingly:
H1: The electorate move to the right as NMGE increases.
26 For example, Keele et al. (2016) follow De Boef and Keele (2008) in arguing that error
correction models can be applied to stationary data, while Esarey (2016) argues that they can
usefully be applied to data generated by a partially differenced process.
27 A further objection that could be made to our use of error correction models based on the
work of Grant and Lebo (2016) is that our data are not really unit root given that our variables
are bounded. They argue that fractionally differencedmodels are more appropriate in these cases.
However, none of our variables come close to reaching their theoretical bounds. Esarey (2016)
shows that the amount of data required to reliably estimate a fractionally differenced process is
far larger than the 64 years of data we have, and also shows that an error correction model can
provide a useful approximation to a fractionally differenced process when cointegration is
present.
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The electorate prefers lower levels of direct tax taxation. Accordingly:
H2: The electorate move to the right as average income tax increases.
Government activity is not the only inﬂuence on mood. Exogenous changes
in the economy can also shape preferences. Increasing unemployment, for
example, will lead the electorate to prefer more activity in order to reduce
unemployment.28 Thus, independently of policy, the electorate will shift left
as unemployment increases. These considerations suggest:
H3: The electorate move to the left as unemployment increases.
We model mood using an error correction model. Given that our variables
are nonstationary and there is a cointegration relation between the
dependent and independent variables, this is appropriate.29 The dependent
variable is a mood. The independent variables are lagged values of average
income tax levels, NMGE and unemployment.
Table 3 displays the estimated coefﬁcients from the error correction model.
The estimated error correction rate (0.81) implies that over 80% of any
deviation of preferences from the target rate in either direction is corrected
within one year. The coefﬁcients provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The
statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients for long-term effects for both
NMGE (b= −0.59) and average income tax rates (b= −0.37) clearly suggest
thermostatic relationships. There is also the short-term relationship betweenΔx
andΔy forNMGE (b= −0.59). As government activity increases, the electorate
moves right and, as government activity decreases, it moves left. The long-term
effect for unemployment also provides support for Hypothesis 3 (b=0.86).30
This evidence conﬁrms the thermostatic hypothesis (Wlezien 1995). The
electorate responds to both policy and economic conditions. Changing
preferences communicate a desire to reduce government activity when “too
hot” and increase it when “too cold”.31 This is evidence of the ﬁrst link in
28 Similarly, inﬂation may lead the electorate to prefer less activity. Inﬂation is not statistically
signiﬁcant in the mood models and is omitted. This is the result of its high correlation with
NMGE (Pearson’s R= 0.60, between 1948 and 2014).
29 The augmented Dickey-Fuller score (lag level 3) for the equation in levels is −4.30. Thus,
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in the error term is rejected at the 1% level, indicating that
cointegration is present. The value of the error correction term is −0.81 with a standard error of
0.12 and thus a t-value of 6.75. The 1% critical t-value for using this parameter as cointegration
test with 64 observations and three variables is 4.23 (calculated from Ericsson and MacKinnon
2002). Thus we conclude cointegration is present.
30 The effects for unemployment and spending reported here are generally stronger than those
reported in Bartle et al. (2011). This is probably because this estimate of mood is only based on
the core economic items and because government spending is measured by NMGE rather
than TME.
31 This is consistent with Stimson’s (1999) core ﬁnding that cycles occur between policy mood
and government activity.
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the “chain of responsiveness” and representation. It is characteristic of both
electoral turnover and policy accommodation mechanisms (Powell 2000).
We now examine the next link in the electoral turnover mechanism:
whether votes respond to mood.
Policy mood and vote intentions
Before proceeding, we must note that preferences are not the only the
plausible inﬂuences on the vote: they are also inﬂuenced by long-term
partisanship (Clarke et al. 2004), policy moderation (Nagel and Wlezien
2010) and evaluations of competence (Green and Jennings 2012).32 From
this list of “usual suspects” we only have indicators of annual party
competence. These are estimated using the dyads ratio algorithm and
drawing on responses to survey questions about which party is best able to
deal with any particular issue (Green and Jennings 2012).33 Unfortunately,
we do not have annual indicators of partisanship or party position at
our disposal. Partisanship was rarely measured in the 1950s and 1960s.
Table 3. What drives the policy mood? (error correction model, 1948–2013)
Error correction −0.81 (0.12)*** t= 6.75
MacKinnon p< 0.01 critical t-value: 4.23
Unemploymentt−1
Long-term 0.86 (0.21)***
Short-term 0.59 (0.10)
Average direct taxt−1
Long-term −0.37 (0.15)**
Short-term −0.11 (0.35)
Domestic spendingt−1
Long-term −0.45 (0.16)***
Short-term −0.59 (0.29)***
N 63
Breusch-Godfrey 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.44
Root MSE 2.66
Augmented Dickey-Fuller value for integrating equation: −4.30 (lag order 3)***
Note: MSE=mean square error.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05.
32 Policy moderation is deﬁned in terms of the distance between the major party and the
Liberal Democrats (or predecessors) in Nagel and Wlezien (2010).
33 Assessments of party competence are estimated using Gallup, Ipsos-Mori and YouGov
data gathered by the authors, separately from Green and Jennings (2012).
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The “traditional” measure of partisanship is, moreover, inﬂuenced by the
same short-term factors that it is assumed to shape (Clarke et al. 2004).
Accordingly, our vote intention model tests two hypotheses:
H4: Increasing evaluations of Labour’s competence increase Labour vote.
H5: Leftwards shifts in the mood increase Labour vote.
Once again we use an error correction model, as there is cointegration
between the dependent and independent variables.34 Table 4 assesses the
relationship between annual Labour vote intentions, mood and evaluations
of Labour competence between 1951 and 2015. The error correction term
is signiﬁcant and correctly signed (b= −0.57) suggesting that 57% of any
deviation of preferences from the target rate is corrected within one year.
Both the long- and short-term coefﬁcients for competence are signiﬁcant
and correctly signed (b= 0.62 and b= 0.74, respectively) providing support
for Hypothesis 4. Crucially, the coefﬁcient for the long-term effect of mood
Table 4. What drives annual vote intentions? (error correction model of
Labour vote intentions, 1951–2015)
Error correction −0.57 (0.12)*** t= 4.75
MacKinnon p< 0.01 critical t-value: 3.29
Moodt−1
Long-term 0.17 (0.08)**
Short-term 0.06 (0.10)
Macrocompetencet−1
Long-term 0.62 (0.17)***
Short-term 0.74 (0.11)***
Constant −7.60 (4.40)*
N 64
Breusch-Godfrey 2.34
Adjusted R2 0.52
Root MSE 2.24
Augmented Dickey-Fuller value for integrating equation: −4.27 (lag order 3)***
Note: MSE=mean square error.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1.
34 The augmented Dickey-Fuller score (lag level 3) for the equation in levels is −4.27. Thus,
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in the error term is rejected at the 1% level, indicating that
cointegration is present. The value of the error correction term is −0.57 with a standard error of
0.12 and thus a t-value of 4.75. The 1% critical t-value for using this parameter as cointegration
test with 64 observations and three variables is 3.29 (calculated from Ericsson and MacKinnon
2002). Thus we conclude cointegration is present.
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is signiﬁcant (b= 0.17). As the mood moves left, Labour vote intentions
increases.35 Hypothesis 5 is conﬁrmed.
These results suggest that variations in mood have an electoral impact net
of evaluations of competence. This provides some evidence for another step
in the electoral turnover mechanism. The effect of competence is greater
than mood. As a result, a move towards (say) the left in mood will not
produce an increase in support for the Labour Party if there is even a small
loss of conﬁdence in the competence of the Labour Party.
Party ideology, mood and policy representation
We now examine whether policy responds to party incumbency or mood. If
NMGE responds to party incumbency, this will conﬁrm that governments
pursue policy consistent with their ideology and provide evidence in favour
of the electoral turnover mechanism. If it responds to mood, this will
provide evidence in favour of the policy accommodation mechanism.
We did not ﬁnd an appropriate cointegrating relationship, and so did not
use an error correction model. Instead, we took the ﬁrst difference of NMGE
and regressed lagged mood, the change in unemployment and the change in
inﬂation on this. This is similar to the approach in Soroka andWlezien (2009).
This speciﬁcation is theoretically appropriate because our operationalisation of
mood is intrinsically thermostatic. Respondents are typically not asked to
name their ideal level of government spending on a programme; they are asked
whether spending is too high, too low or about right. Left-wing mood means
that the public demands more public spending than at present. As a result, we
would expect the left-wing mood to produce an increase in spending.
If electoral turnover was producing a representation, who is in govern-
ment should “make a difference” (Rose 1980). Labour governments should
spend more than Conservative governments other things being equal.36
Accordingly, the electoral turnover model suggests:
H6: Labour governments have higher levels of NMGE than Conservative.
35 Mood does not appear to inﬂuence Conservative or Liberal Democrat vote intentions. It
should be noted that mood is signiﬁcant in Labour vote models for general elections (N=16)
where controls are imposed for Labour’s position (as represented by the RILE scores), a count
variable (capturing unmeasured variables) and evaluations of competence.
36 Between 1945 and 2010 there were a total of eight turnovers of power (1945, 1951, 1964,
1970, February 1974, 1979, 1997 and 2010). The turnovers in 1951 and 1964 occurred late in
the year, so in those years Labour are treated as the incumbents in 1951 and the Conservatives are
treated as the incumbents in 1964. The turnover in February 1974 took place in February 1974
took place in early March, so Labour is treated as the incumbent government. In all other cases
(1945, 1970, 1979, 1997 and 2010), the turnover took place in the middle of the year and these
are coded as 0.
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If policy accommodation was producing a representation, NMGE should
respond to the preferences communicated by variations in mood. The
government could anticipate that the electorate will punish it if it does not
deliver policies compatible with the mood of the electorate. This will lead to
the government reacting to the current policy mood, perhaps with a
lag. However, it could also anticipate what the mood the public will have at
the time of the next election. If it is able to do this, then the future mood will
have an effect on current policy. We test both possibilities.
H7: Increases in the policy mood should increase NMGE.
Table 5 displays the coefﬁcients generated by ﬁve models. First, we model
NMGE as a function of mood in the previous period, the change in
unemployment and the previous period’s inﬂation rate. In the second
model, we take into account policy mood in each of the previous four years,
to explore the effect of a change in mood over a ﬁve-year parliament. We
then add political variables to each of these models, producing models 3
and 4. We include a variable representing whether Labour was in
government, together with a dummy variable for 1974. Public spending in
that year increased by 4.5% of GDP as a result of factors such as the oil
crisis and the miners’ strike (see Figure 2). Finally, in model 5 we consider
whether the government’s anticipation of the mood at the time of the next
election has an effect on policy. We add a variable for the level of mood
forecasted in the next period using the data available to that point.37
The ﬁrst thing that is apparent from inspecting the ﬁve models is that
mood has no signiﬁcant effect on domestic spending – indeed the estimated
coefﬁcients are very close to 0. This is true even if we add the effects of four
lags of mood. The mood forecasted for the next period also does not
have a statistically signiﬁcant effect. These results are inconsistent with
Hypothesis 8. There is no support for the idea that movements in mood lead
to an increase in NMGE, whether we control for the effect of the party in
government or not. There is no support for the policy accommodation
mechanism.
By contrast, the coefﬁcient for the party in government does have a
signiﬁcant effect. As importantly, this effect is substantially very signiﬁcant.
According to our models, Labour governments raise domestic spending by
between0.51 and0.67%ofGDPper yearmore thanConservative governments.
37 We estimated a univariate autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model for
our policy mood measure. The best ﬁtting model involved differencing the mood once and had a
ﬁrst-order moving average term [ARIMA (0, 1, 1)]. The moving average term was −0.46 with a
standard error of 0.11, and the sigma for the overall model was 3.51. This model was then used to
create a forecast for each period based on the data from previous periods.
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Table 5. What drives annual policy? (modelling domestic government expenditure, 1949–2013)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Moodt−1 −0.03 (0.04) −0.07 (0.06) 0.00 (0.04) −0.04 (0.05) −0.41(0.73)
Moodt−2 −0.05 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06) −0.17 (0.33)
Moodt−3 0.05 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) −0.07 (0.17)
Moodt−4 0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04) −0.01 (0.10)
Forecasted mood 0.68 (1.32)
Sum of lags and forecast (mood) −0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
ΔUnemployment 0.74 (0.23)*** 0.69 (0.24)*** 0.80 (0.20)*** 0.78 (0.21)*** 0.76 (0.21)***
Inﬂationt−1 −0.08 (0.05)* −0.08 (0.05)* −0.09 (0.04)** −0.09 (0.04)** −0.08 (0.04)**
Labour in government 0.67 (0.32)** 0.60 (0.34)* 0.51 (0.38)
1974 dummy 4.64 (1.18)*** 4.65 (1.21)*** 4.70 (1.23)***
Constant 2.40 (2.33) 1.31 (2.54) 0.37 (2.15) −0.60 (2.34) −1.01 (2.48)
N 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.34 0.33 0.32
MSE 1.33 1.33 1.15 1.16 1.17
Note: MSE=mean square error.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p<0.1.
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Thus we ﬁnd strong support for Hypothesis 8. Essentially parties keep
pursuing the policies they are committed to, regardless of changes in
public mood.
The effects of the various control variables are as expected. A change in
unemployment leads to a very substantial increase in public spending. This
is not unsurprising as unemployment directly increases spending on unem-
ployment beneﬁt and other social programmes. Inﬂation leads to small, but
signiﬁcant fall in spending. Again this is what we would expect as inﬂation
makes it easier for governments to cut programmes by simply not fully
indexing them. The dummy variable for 1974 also has the expected effect.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the impression in Figure 3. Simply put, “party
matters” (Blais et al. 1996). Labour’s reputation as the party of “big” or
“bigger” government party is based on fact. So is the Conservative party’s
reputation as the party of “small” or “smaller” government. This part
of the “electoral turnover” mechanism works very well – the parties
offer voters a consistent and reliable choice between “more” or “less”
government. We would expect that in the long-run changes in mood will
lead to a change in government, which will, in turn, lead to a change in
policy in line with public preferences. However, as we saw in the last
section, the mood only has a weak effect on party support, and this can
easily be overwhelmed by considerations of competence.38 Although we
would expect “the electoral turnover”mechanism to work in the long-run,
it may well fail for a considerable time if voters believe the opposition to
be incompetent.
Discussion
The proposition that the electorate’s preferences inﬂuences their votes
seems implausible given what is known about the “typical voter” (Achen
and Bartels 2016). Yet, in Britain, as in the United States (US), “our
knowledge of the individual voter turns out not to be a reliable guide for
generalising to the electorate and its role in democratic politics” (Erikson
et al. 2002, 3). Variations in mood communicate real preferences and
inﬂuence vote decisions.39 These “messages”, however, are not acted on.
Representation can only work by turning over power from “one side” to
“the other”. The parties play their part by reliably pursuing policies
consistent with their left-right ideology.
Our ﬁndings contrast with other studies that suggest that there is a degree
of policy accommodation. Soroka andWlezien’s (2009) study, for example,
38 The impact of moodmay be different if we had a reliable annual measure of party position.
39 Biases in the electoral system may reduce policy responsiveness (Johnston et al. 2012).
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uncovered evidence of policy representation in speciﬁc domains such as
defence, social affairs, health and education between 1978 and 1995.40
Preferences in those domains responded thermostatically to spending.
Policy, in turn, responded to preferences. Soroka and Wlezien measure
preferences using responses to speciﬁc Gallup questions about whether
spending in those domains should be increased or decreased and they
measure policy by spending in the same domains. This approach assumes
that variations in these individual series reﬂect preferences and spending in
a particular domain.41 It seems wholly reasonable to suggest, however, that
preferences in those domains may also partly reﬂect the general policy
mood and overall spending. The observed “thermostatic” effect may well
reﬂect the diminishing marginal utility of spending in that domain, but it
may also reﬂect the electorate’s ambivalence to government activity – in
particular, its aversion to taxes and borrowing. This is particularly the case
in those areas of government activity that account for a large share of
spending.42 It might be informative, therefore, to repeat Soroka and
Wlezien’s analyses controlling for the policy mood (less those items relating
to a speciﬁc domain) and overall spending.43 The overall budget constraint
must also impose constraints on spending and responsiveness.
Our ﬁndings also contrast with Erikson et al.’s study of responsiveness
and representation in the US, which concluded that policy was sensitive to
preferences. This study, like our own, used mood to measure preferences.44
Policy was measured, however, using congressional rating scales and roll
call outcomes (Erikson et al. 2002, 294–295).45 Analogous indicators are
not available in the British case. Even if such measures were available,
they would have less validity. Party discipline is strong and there are few
defections on ideological votes (Cowley 2002). It may be that the US system
40 Their study also covered representation in the US and Canada.
41 Soroka and Wlezien used lagged dependent variables. The results are laid out in Soroka
and Wlezien (2009, 96, table 5.2).
42 Soroka and Wlezien (2009, 170) recognise that thermostatic responses and policy
accommodation are more likely in the most “important” domains. Importance is presumably
correlated with total spending. They were unable to examine the welfare domain because reliable
time series data on welfare spending was not available (Soroka et al. 2006). Welfare accounted
for around 35% of total government spending in 2015.
43 Just as in our analyses, Soroka andWlezienmeasure policy by budgets. Spending, however,
is measured in real terms rather than as a percentage of GDP. This difference does not account for
our ﬁndings. Replacing NMGE as a proportion of GDP with TME in real terms makes no
difference. There is no evidence of policy accommodation.
44 They imposed fewer assumptions than we do here and included many items relating to
“social issues”. This is unlikely to make any difference for reasons outline above.
45 Erikson et al. (2002) produce indicators for both the House of Representatives and
President. This makes little sense in Britain, given the effective “fusion” of the legislature and
executive.
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of checks and balances ensures that preferences are taken into consideration
(Powell 2000). The same may be true of “consensus” democracies (Lijphart
1999). There is clearly a need for collaborative research along the lines of
the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al. 2009).
Our results also differ greatly from those of Hakhverdian (2010), who
argues that there is a high degree of policy responsiveness in the British case,
and furthermore that this is the result of “rational anticipation”, a process
roughly equivalent to what we refer to as “policy accommodation”.
However, the different results are unsurprising when we consider how
Hakhverdian measures government policy. Like us, Hakhverdian seeks to
explain how left- or right-wing government policy is. However, unlike us he
does not measure this in terms of government actions, such as tax and
spending decisions, but rather by the content of budget speeches, using the
Wordscores programme (Laver et al. 2003).46 It seems that when public
opinion moves to the left, governments include more left-wing themes in
their budget statements, but do not change tax or spending behaviour.
Our ﬁndings also appear to contrast with the policy agendas literature
(Jennings and John 2009; Bertelli and John 2013; John et al. 2013; Bevan
and Jennings 2014). This literature demonstrates that government attention
(as measured by the content of the ofﬁcial policy speeches) is responsive to
the public’s policy agenda (as measured by responses to the most important
issue or most important problem question). This contrast is, however, more
apparent than real, as quite different things are being measured. British
governments appear to be responsive in the sense of addressing the issues
that the public thinks are important. However, when it comes to decisions
about the level of spending, they follow their party ideologies.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that domestic spending policy is not responsive to mood
and is driven, instead, by economic conditions and party control (Strøm
1990; Blais et al. 1996). That is to say, we do not ﬁnd evidence of “policy
accommodation” by governments – governments pursue policies
consistent with their ideologies unaffected by changes in public opinion.
46 TheWordscores programme essentially compares word frequencies in reference and virgin
texts. The application of these methods to long time series is a cause of concern since the voca-
bulary of politics is likely to change over 70 years. The choice of reference texts is of crucial
importance. Hedging by using a large number of references texts tends to “ﬂatten out” variations
(Budge and Pennings 2007). There are other issues: “estimated document scores are on the wrong
scale and the theoretical development does not specify a statistical model, so it is unclear what
assumptions the methodmakes about political text and how to tell whether they ﬁt particular text
analysis applications” (Lowe 2008, 356).
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The unresponsiveness of governments seems surprising given the “power
hoarding” nature of the British constitution (King 2007). British governments
are guaranteed a parliamentary majority. The government at Westminster is
not constrained by federal structures. The principle of parliamentary sover-
eignty, moreover, implies that the courts do not have the power of constitu-
tional review. British governments have the power to either respond to or
anticipate the impact of preferences – but they do not appear so.
We do ﬁnd evidence that public opinion may affect policy through the
mechanism of “electoral turnover”. We ﬁnd that changes in policy mood
affect voting intentions. If policy mood moves against the ideology of the
current government, it will lose support and eventually be replaced by a
government whose ideology reﬂects the public’s mood. This should lead to
a correction in policy in line with public opinion. However, this process
may take a considerable amount of time. We ﬁnd that the effect of
policy mood on voting intentions is not as strong as the effect of people’s
assessment of government competence. If the public lacks faith in the
competence of the opposition, the government may retain power for
a considerable amount of time, even though it may be moving policy in the
opposite direction the public wants.
One reason for our ﬁndings may be that the “mandate” from the
previous general election has greater moral force than the requirement to
adjust policies to current opinion. If a strategy of policy accommodation
were followed, moreover, it would erode a party’s reputation for reliability
and responsibility (Downs 1957). Governments may follow their ideo-
logical impulses to maintain appeals to members, donors or core voters
(Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Trimming policy to reﬂect the “feedback” from
public preferences may create intraparty tensions (Budge et al. 2010).
Conservative governments that increase taxes, for example, will outrage
business interests and the middle class. Labour governments that cut
spending will antagonise trade unions and public sector workers. The
policy may be responsive to majority opinion within governing parties
(Hussey and Zaller 2011).
Even if governing parties were willing – in principle – to respond to
mood, they may not be able to detect it. Evidence about public preferences
largely comes from snapshots of opinion. Viewed in cross-section, however,
preferences are characterised by considerable ambivalence. People often
appear to take “different sides” on the same issue and different “sides” on
“seemingly related” issues (Stimson 2004). The typical snapshots of
preferences on diverse issues may communicate no clear signal. Indeed, the
sheer amount of data may produce considerable uncertainty about “what
the public want “ (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Druckman and Jacobs 2006).
The mood is only uncovered once issues are standardised in terms of left
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and right and then aggregated (Converse 1990). It is understandable that
governments fall back on ideology (Budge 1994).
Given this uncertainty about what people want, it seems only reasonable to
suggest that politicians will select evidence or interpret trends in ways that are
politically congenial. Ideology provides the emotional basis for the sort of
“motivated reasoning” (Epley and Gilovich 2016). Comments such as “it’s
not what we are hearing on the doorstep” may reﬂect either unconscious
biases or wilful ignorance but both result in a failure to “receive” dis-
comforting feedback (Kingdon 1967). Finally, even if governments can
“hear” the change ofmood and even if they are prepared to act on it, theymay
believe that other factors – such as the “costs of the ruling” will lead to their
inevitable defeat (Naanstead and Paldam 2002). If governments believe that
the swings of the pendulum operate independently of policy theymaywell fall
back on their ideology (Budge 1994).
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